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Political Offenses In Extradition: Time
For Judicial Abstention
By JAMES G. CLARK
Member of the Class of 1982
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the nineteenth century virtually every United
States extradition treaty has contained an article excepting from extra-
dition persons charged with "political" offenses.' Extradition magis-
trates, whose primary statutory duty is to determine probable cause,
have assumed the additional burden of deciding whether the offense
charged is political, therefore exempting the defendant from extradi-
tion. As modes of political opposition have become more complex, the
courts have been unable to develop a workable test to distinguish be-
tween political and non-political offenses.
Extradition decisions have foreign policy implications. The State
Department is therefore given the ultimate power to grant or deny ex-
tradition, once a magistrate has determined that there is sufficient evi-
dence to sustain the charge. This statutory division of the extradition
process into a political dimension and a legal (probable cause) dimen-
sion, has been disrupted by the encroachment of the judiciary into the
area of political offense determinations.
This Note contends that the roles of the judiciary and the execu-
tive should be clearly divided in extradition proceedings. The judici-
ary, whose training and experience lies in determining probable cause,
should continue to decide whether a requesting state has presented suf-
ficient evidence of criminality to sustain the charge against the accused.
A determination of the political or non-political character of an offense,
however, involves decisions within the realm of international politics
and foreign policy, areas in which courts are ill-adapted. Decisions of
1. Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1322 (1962);
Epps, The Validiy of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L. J. 61, 63 (1979). See also Lubet & Czackes, The Role
of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 193 (1980).
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this kind should be left to the State Department, which is uniquely
equipped to consider the extradition request within its international
context.
The Note examines the inconsistent results reached in three recent
extradition decisions involving international terrorism. It then shows
that harmonious decisions could have been reached had the courts used
the division-of-responsibility approach presented here.
I. THE EXTRADITION BACKGROUND
A. Extradition
Extradition is "the formal surrender of a person by a state to an-
other state for prosecution or punishment."2 It is, despite its interna-
tional character, a national act. The legal duty to surrender a fugitive
arises only from bilateral or multilateral treaties. Procedural matters
are governed by the laws of the requested state and are rarely affected
or modified by treaty language A typical treaty lists the offenses or
crimes for which extradition will be granted,4 as well as one or more
exceptional cases in which extradition will be denied.'
B. Political Offenses
Virtually every extradition treaty to which the United States is a
party contains a political offense exception.' Although wording varies,
a typical provision reads: "A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered
if the crime or offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded is
one of a political character. .... I
The historical basis of the exception lies in the ancient concept of
asylum, which was preserved through the Middle Ages as a part of
2. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 Am. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 21 (1935).
3. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1963). See also Can-
trell, The Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: 4 Comparison of the
United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 777 (1977); Bas-
siouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition-
A Proposed Judicial Standardfor an Unru Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 217, 225 (1969).
4. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, Uiiited States---Great Britain, art. 3, 47
Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849. Treaty offenses generally include crimes of violence (homicide,
assault, rape, kidnapping) as well as theft, arson, narcotics offenses, piracy, and some eco-
nomic crimes (embezzlement, counterfeiting).
5. Id., arts. 4, 6 (double jeopardy, political crimes).
6. See Note, supra note 1.
7. Extradition Treaty, United States-Great Britain, supra note 4, art. 6.
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Church doctrine.' The almost universal inclusion of a political offense
exception in nineteenth and twentieth century extradition treaties was
the result of "[t]he growth and evolution of political institutions to-
wards the liberal state together with the rise of individualism [which]
sparked [a] concern for the political offender, especially where he had
escaped from a nation with mbre 'benighted' views of government." 9
The early political offenders were usually unsuccessful revolutionaries,
and nations which had recently gained their own freedom were sympa-
thetic towards those who had tried, but failed, to defeat an oppressive
government.
1. Pure Political Offenses
Changing methods of political protest have led to the realization
that some offenses are more obviously political than others. Therefore,
political offenses have been categorized in two classes.
"Pure" political offenses are the political acts typical of nineteenth
century patriotic revolutionaries-treason, sedition, and espionage.
Though not crimesper se, these acts are labelled crimes since the fugi-
tive's conduct is directed against the form and political organization of
the state itself. The acts involved in such offenses are merely "subjec-
tive threat[s] to a political ideology or its supporting structures .. ."10
Extradition is routinely denied when charges are based upon these
offenses.'"
2. Relative Political Offenses
"Relative" political offenses present a much more difficult prob-
lem. The acts committed are indistinguishable from common crimes,
but may become political offenses where a nexus is established between
the crime and the political act.' 2 Relative political offenses are usually
acts of violence against individuals, particularly those connected with
the government. Embezzlement of funds, later used to support political
activities, has also been included in this category.' 3 A relative political
8. Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal fRecent
French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 269 (1980).
9. Epps, supra note 1, at 63.
10. Harvard Research in International Law, Extradition, supra note 2, at 13.
11. For a more detailed discussion, see Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses:
A Knotty Problem o/Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1237-39 (1962). Apparently the
denial of extradition in pure political offense cases is so routine that it is seldom contested.
There are no reported United States cases on pure political offenses.
12. Cantrell, supra note 3, at 780; Garcfa-Mora, supra note 11, at 1239.
13. Jimenez v; Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
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offender presents the requested state with the unpleasant dilemma of
"wishing to punish the offender without at the same time violating the
well-established principle of nonextradition of political criminals." 4
Establishing a workable definition of a relative political offense has
proved to be the most difficult aspect of extradition proceedings.
C. The Incidence Test of Anglo-American Law
The Anglo-American definition of a relative political offense was
first judicially announced in 1891, in the English case In re Castioni.'"
It stated that fugitives "are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes,
if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political distur-
bances."' 6 Four years later a United States District Court basically
adopted the Castioni "incidence test" in In re Ezeta.Y The American
court included within its definition "acts of vioience of a political char-
acter with a political object, and [done] as part of the political move-
ment and rising in which. . .[the offender] was taking part."'"
The incidence test remains the controlling definition of a political
offense to this day. However, advances in communications and trans-
portation, and the struggles accompanying post-colonial independence
in many nations have created an international political situation far
more complex than the situation which existed in 1890 when the test
was announced. 19 In their attempts to use a nineteenth century defini-
tion in the twentieth century, coirts must often resort to "obvious short
cuts which frustrate the just application of the law"20 and which have
resulted in a "total lack of consistency"'" in extradition decisions.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE INCIDENCE TEST IN
AMERICAN COURTS
A. Conflicting Definitions and Results
The incidence test does not define the activities which are to be
14. Garcia-Mora, supra note 11, at 1239.
15. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
16. Id. at 166 (Hawkins, J.).
17. 62 F. 972 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1894).
18. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 161 (Denman, J.) quoted in 62 F. at 999.
19. It has become far easier for a political act to be planned in one country and carried
out in a second, while the offenders can easily flee to yet a third state. Of particular concern
in the extradition field are the activities of transnational terrorists, who have become able
"to pursue their activities unimpeded by national boundaries." Carbonneau, supra note 8,
at 266.
20. Garcfa-Mora, supra note 11, at 1248.
21. Epps, supra note 1, at 83.
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considered as "political disturbances." Left to ad hoc determinations,
courts have developed two approaches which have often led to irrecon-
cilable decisions based on similar factual situations.
One approach reads political disturbance broadly to include any
situation where adherents of opposing ideologies come in contact with
each other. This approach was used by two district courts in the ex-
tended Artukovic litigation,' in which a former official of the Croatian
government was charged with ordering the murder of thousands of ci-
vilians during World War II. The district court,23 "with more emotion
than judicial reasoning"'24 held that the complaint on its face showed a
political offense. The Supreme Court reversed, requiring that a hearing
be held. On remand, the trial court, which took judicial notice that
"for years the peoples of the Balkans were in disagreement," found that
the acts charged were committed during a political disturbance and de-
nied extradition. 25 The Artukovic standard for political disturbance
suggests that any crime which is committed during turbulent times is a
political, non-extraditable offense.
A second approach gives a narrower reading to the concept of
political disturbance. The defendant in In re Gonzalez26 was accused
of murdering two prisoners under his care during the Trujillo regime in
the Dominican Republic. Trujillo's successors sought his return on the
charge of murder.
The court found that no clear uprising or political disturbance was
involved and that "the general rule is that there must be an 'uprising,'
and that the acts in question must be incidental to it." It further ob-
served that "nothing in the record . ..suggests that [the defendant]
acted with such essentially political motives or political ends as might
justify substantial relaxation of the 'political disturbance' require-
ment."'27 In granting extradition, the court refused to interpret sporadic
factional battles and revolutionary activity in the country as political
disturbances.
22. Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Ivancevic v.
Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert denied 348 U.S. 818 (1955), rehearing denied
348 U.S. 889 (1955), remanded sub nom. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal.
1956), af'd sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and
remanded 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (per curiam), surrender denied on remand sub nom. United
States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). Details of the travels of this case
from court to court are given in the final District Court opinion.
23. 140 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
24. Garcfa-Mora, supra note 11, at 1247.
25. 170 F. Supp. at 392.
26. 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
27. Id. at 721.
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The confusion wrought by having two different standards for
political disturbances is demonstrated by comparison of In re Gonzalez
with the factually similar case of Ramos v. Diaz.28 Humberto Diaz and
Roberto Cruzata had been members of Fidel Castro's revolutionary
army and were later convicted by the Castro government of murdering
a prisoner under their care. They escaped from jail and fled to the
United States where a Florida District Court denied extradition. Rely-
ing on both Karadole v. Artukovic29 and In re Castioni,30 the court
held that since "the crime was incident to and was committed as a part
of a political disturbance or conflict between the Batista group and the
Castro group then contesting for political power in Cuba, it was a polit-
ical crime and as such not subject to extradition. ' 3 I This holding can-
not logically be reconciled with that of In re Gonzalez. In each case,
prisoners were killed by their guards in areas far from the battlefront.
It appears that the courts are trying to apply the incidence test with
enough flexibility to encompass modem political situations. However,
that test becomes meaningless as each court struggles to balance the
theory of asylum against the needs of foreign policy as perceived by
that court.32 Judges are foreign policy amateurs; their flexible substan-
tive approach necessarily leads to an unpredictability in extradition de-
cisions which has disturbing implications for world political order.
B. International Terrorism-Three Recent Cases
The rise of terrorism as a common means of political opposition
has placed a severe strain on international crime prevention mecha-
nisms, and is a source of concern in the international community.3
Extradition can be a particularly effective measure by which to bring
terrorists to justice.34 A comparison of three recent extradition cases
shows the unsuitability of the incidence test in resolving the complex
issues presented by requests to extradite alleged terrorists.
28. 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
29. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
30. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
31. 179 F. Supp. at 463, The court seems to have reasoned away the unusual fact that
Diaz was being sought not by the opposing faction, but by his own side. This makes a
political motivation, at least that of political revenge, much less likely.
32. Epps, supra note 1, at 74.
33. One response to increased terrorist activities is the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, openedfor signature Jan. 27, 1977, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERiALS 1272 (1976).
34. Id. at 1272. See also Carbonnean, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition and
Transnational Terrorists Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Norms Created, 1 A. STu-
DENT INT'L L. Socs. INT'L L. J. 1 (1977).
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1. In re McMullen
35
McMullen was a member of the Irish Republican Army, who fled
to the United States after bombing a British army barracks in England
and causing several deaths. The extradition magistrate, relying on In re
Castieni36 and Karadzole v. Artukovic, 37 required the accused to show:
(1) that he committed the offense during a political uprising; (2) that he
was a member of a group engaged in that uprising; and (3) that he was
engaged in an act of violence with a political end.
The court took judicial notice of the political situation in Northern
Ireland,31 declaring it to be a political uprising. The government ad-
mitted that McMullen was an IRA member, but presented evidence to
show that the bombing was done for personal rather than political rea-
sons. The court rejected this evidence and held that since the bombing
of army installations was a common method used by the IRA, McMul-
len's actions must have been directed by that organization as a part of
terrorist activities incidental to the continuing uprising. Extradition
was denied.
2. In re Eain
39
Eain, a member of Al Fatah (a branch of the Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization), placed a bomb in a trash bin at the site of a youth
rally celebrating Israeli Independence Day in Tiberias, Israel. The
court cited no cases, but applied a test similar to that used in McMul-
len. The magistrate found that Eain "was a member of a P.L.O. organ-
ization and with motivation toward its political objective." She found
no evidence, however, that tended "to show that this act was directed in
opposition to the State of Israel and that the crime furthered the cause
of his group objective,"'  and granted extradition.
35. In re McMullen, mem., Mag. No. 3-78-1099-MG (N.D. Cal., May 11, 1979).
36. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
37. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
38. McMullen was decided under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which seem to pro-
hibit taking judicial notice of such uncertain events. FED. R. EviD. 201(b) reads:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accu-
racy cannot reasonably be questioned.
This would seem to preclude judicial notice of the realities of a situation as confused as that
in Northern Ireland, which is neither generally known nor capable of accurate and ready
determination.
39. In re Extradition of Ziyad Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. ilL, Dec. 18, 1979).
40. Id. slip op. at 20.
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3. Escobedo v. United States4
Escobedo and Castillo, two Cuban exiles, attempted to kidnap the
Cuban consul to Mexico, hoping to exchange him for political prison-
ers held in Cuba. The attempt failed but a consular official was killed.
The defendants fled to the United States. The court found that the
defendants were members of a group opposing the Cuban government,
and were acting from political motivations for political ends. Despite
this finding, the court held that the crimes were not political offenses
because there was not an ongoing violent political uprising against the
Cuban government.42
C. Dangers of the Incidence Test in the Terrorism Context
These three decisions point to the dangers inherent in the inci-
dence test. Although two of the three holdings reach results consistent
with combatting international terrorism, neither declares terrorism to
be outside the definition of a political offense. Implicit in both Eain
and Escobedo is the message so explicitly stated in McMullen: a mem-
ber of a well-known terrorist organization may be granted asylum by
the courts of the United States as long as he directly attacks the govern-
ment which his group actively opposes.
Suppose that Eain had placed his bomb in an Israeli army vehicle,
or in the city hall of Tiberias, but killed the very same students; or that
Escobedo and Castillo had killed the consular aide on the day of the
Bay of Pigs invasion. Would extradition have been granted? The an-
swer is not clear under present American practice.
The international effort to combat terrorism requires that the
available legal sanctions be applied consistently and predictably. In-
cautious application of the political offense exception in the United
States could act as a serious impediment to bringing fugitive criminal
offenders to justice.
IV. A NEW EXTRADITION PROCESS: SEPARATION
OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS FROM LEGAL
ISSUES
A new approach to extradition is needed which will not call upon
the courts to make broad political determinations within the limited
context of extradition hearings. This can be done by separating the
41. 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 612 (1981).
42. Id. at 1104.
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political and the legal components of the extradition process. The
courts would perform their customary function of determining whether
a requesting state has presented sufficient credible evidence to sustain
the charge against the fugitive. The executive branch would then con-
sider whether an accused should be shielded from extradition as a
political offender. This procedure would let each branch perform an
analysis for which it is best suited. It would also protect the right of the
accused to a hearing before a fair and impartial magistrate. No major
changes are needed in either statutory or treaty law to implement the
proposed division-of-responsibility approach. The judiciary needs only
to recognize that the political offense determination is a "political ques-
tion" which should be made by the political branch of government.
A. The "Political Question" Doctrine
The "political question" doctrine states, in effect: "there are some
cases which courts ought not to decide."43 It involves a judicial deci-
sion to refrain from becoming involved in certain kinds of disputes
which are legally brought to the courts. For various practical reasons,
however, the court withdraws from consideration of the controversy,
deferring instead to a coordinate branch of government.
Cases involving the "foreign relations of the United States have
provided [one] group of leading cases commonly cited as instances of
judicial abstention because the issues were political."'  The Supreme
Court explained the basis for abstention in Chicago & Southern Air
Lines v. Waterman Steamshp Corp:4
"the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is polit-
ical, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confined by our Consti-
tution to the political departments of the government, Executive and
Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements
of prophecy. They... should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither apti-
tude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to
belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intru-
sion or inquiry."
43. See generally, Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. 1. 597
(1976). See also Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts ofthe United States: "Political Questions",
63 AM. J. IN'L L. 284 (1969).
44. Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, supra note 43, at 610-11.
45. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
46. Id., at I11.
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The constitutional basis for a judicial decision to abstain, and the
merits or demerits of making it, have been debated at length elsewhere
and are beyond the scope of this Note.47 What is important to this
discussion is that the courts have chosen to defer to the executive in
foreign relations cases concerning state secrets, 48 recognition of foreign
governments, 49 questions of sovereignty over foreign territory,5 ° and
deportation of aliens.5"
Nothing in the political question doctrine requires a court to ab-
stain from deciding every case which has foreign policy implications.
Rather, each situation must be subjected to a discriminating analysis of
the particular question posed. Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker v.
Carr52 holds that the factors to be considered in the analysis are "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment. . . to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it. . .or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question."53
B. Application of the Doctrine to Political Offense Decisions
Political offense determinations can easily be considered political
questions under the Baker v. Carr test. The Supreme Court found a
"textually demonstrable constitutional basis" for abstention in a depor-
tation case, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,5 4 which raised most of the im-
portant political issues to be found in an extradition hearing:
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to
the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance
of a republican form of government.55 Such matters are so exclu-
47. See Bickel, The Supreme Court: 1960 Term-Foreword" The Passive Virtues, 75
HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961), establishing a broad, "pragmatic" doctrine; Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAiv. L. Rlv. 1 (1959), placing a duty on the
judiciary to decide all issues; Henkin, Is There a 'Political Question" Doctrine?, supra note
43, presenting a synthesis of the two positions. Much of the analysis which follows is based
on Henkin's writings.
48. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
49. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
50. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
51. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
52. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
53. Id., at 217.
54. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
55. These are, of course, constitutional powers of the political branches. See U.S.
CONST., art. III, § 2; art. 1, § 7, para. 11; art. IV, § 4.
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sively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.56
The "lack of a judicially manageable standard" for political of-
fense determinations is demonstrated by the inconsistent court deci-
sions discussed previously.
Finally, there exists "the potentiality of embarrassment" due to
conflicting judicial and executive pronouncements in cases like In re
McMullen,"' where extradition of a confessed terrorist is denied by the
courts. Similar decisions could prove embarrassing if the United States
were perceived as failing in its international commitment to combat
terrorism. In addition, the current extradition process may effectively
curtail* State Department prerogatives because "the requesting state is
much more likely to be irate if a court deems the fugitive extraditable
but the executive reverses that decision."5 8
Under the Baker v. Carr analysis, therefore, courts could reason-
ably consider political offense determinations to be political questions
from which they should abstain. The decision to abstain would not, of
course, deprive the courts of jurisdiction over the procedural or due
process component of the extradition hearing. The political question
doctrine allows the courts to abstain from deciding particular political
questions-it does not require them to avoid other issues in the same
case. Any constitutional extradition process must recognize the dual
nature of extradition proceedings and guarantee a judicial hearing
before commitment.
C. Separation of Powers in the Extradition Statute
The procedures prescribed by the United States extradition stat-
ute59 are relatively simple. Initially, there must be a valid treaty of
56. 342 U.S. at 588-89. This passage was written ten years before the test was formu-
lated, but it considers many of the same factors.
57. Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
58. Epps, supra note 1, at 84.
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1976). The operative section of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184,
reads:
Fugitives from foreign country to United States:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or
any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of
a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension
of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or
No. 1]
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extradition in force between the United States and the requesting na-
tion.60 A representative of that nation must initiate proceedings by
filing a verified complaint under oath which charges the fugitive of-
fender with one or more crimes enumerated in the applicable treaty.
The complaint is then filed with the extradition magistrate, and a war-
rant issued for the fugitive's arrest.
The fugitive is brought before the magistrate for a hearing to de-
termine "whether the demanding state has shown reasonable ground to
believe the fugitive has committed an extraditable offense."'62  The
magistrate's responsibility is limited to making an inquiry like that of a
committing magistrate and no more.63 The burden is on the requesting
state to make out a prima facie case of the charged offense.'
Evidence at the hearing may include witness testimony as well as
documents which are properly authenticated by the requesting govern-
ment under its own criminal rules,65 but which need not conform to
formal evidentiary standards. The accused may offer explanatory evi-
dence concerning the allegations made by the requesting state, but he
has "no right. . . to present evidence calculated only to contradict the
demanding country's proof or pose questions of credibility."66 If the
magistrate "deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under
the provisions of the proper treaty ...he shall certify the same, to-
gether with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secre-
tary of State. ... 6
The Secretary is given discretionary authority to review de novo-
the proceedings of the magistrate, and may recommend that the Presi-
magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and consid-
ered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same,
together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of
State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of
such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipu-
lations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commit-
ment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such
surrender shall be made.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1976).
61. Id. The magistrate may be any state or federal judge, or U.S. Magistrate in whose
jurisdiction the fugitive is found.
62. Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public Order,
36 TENN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1968).
63. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1962).
64. In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
65. 18 U.S..C. § 3190 (1976).
66. In re Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
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dent refuse extradition despite the magistrate's contrary finding.68 The
Secretary may refuse to surrender, inter alia, "if he deems it inexpedi-
ent to extradite the fugitive 'on grounds of public policy bearing on
international relations.' "69 In practice, the Secretary has always based
refusal on a finding that the treaty, as interpreted by him, did not re-
quire extradition."0
Nowhere in the statute is there a requirement or a suggestion that
the magistrate should determine whether some exception in the treaty
applies. Rather, the statute may be read to say that the magistrate's
duty involves only weighing evidence, deciding whether the crime is
included in the treaty, and certifying his findings to the Secretary.1 On
its face, the statute does not impose a duty to decide whether an ac-
cused may be granted asylum despite a finding in favor of extradition.
The statute appears to favor a division of authority between the
judiciary and the executive: the courts are to make probable cause de-
terminations, while the executive may, at its discretion, surrender the
fugitive according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention. 2
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITY PROCESS TO RECENT
CASES
The division-of-responsibility procedure would be simple in appli-
cation and would result in extradition decisions consistent not only
with each other, but also with the foreign policy interests of the United
States. Applying the procedure to the facts of the three recent political
offense cases mentioned above73 demonstrates the effectiveness of the
suggested approach.
In each case, the defendant was brought before a magistrate fol-
lowing the presentation by the requesting government of authenticated
charging documents. All three defendants were allowed a hearing in
which they could present evidence and legal claims. Each chose first to
challenge the adequacy of the charging documents. Within the scope
68. Epps, supra note 1, at 75.
69. Id. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 reads "that a warrant may issue," and § 3186
reads "the Secretary of State may order the ... [fugitive] ... to be delivered. . . ." This
language is substantially the same as §§ 5270 and 5272 of the Revised Statutes (1877) which
was interpreted in In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 302 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 13563) to give
complete discretion to the Secretary to refuse surrender.
70. Note, supra note 1, at 1316.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976).
73. See text accompanying notes 35-42, supra.
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allowable in a "probable cause" hearing, the magistrates considered the
adequacy question by examining the authentication procedure detailed
in the extradition statute.74 Each magistrate found the proofs to be suf-
ficient to indicate that a crime was committed, and that the defendant
committed it.
The charges against the fugitives in each of these cases included
murder. Although this is the first-listed extraditable offense in each of
the treaties involved, the magistrates formally examined and accepted
the offered proof that the crimes charged were crimes under the laws of
both requesting and requested state. They then made specific findings
that the crimes charged were extraditable offenses under the treaty
involved.75
In the absence of a political offense claim, each hearing would
have ended with those four essential judicial findings. The magistrate
would have certified the accused to the Secretary of State76 along with a
record of the proofs and testimony taken, and the judicial requirements
of the statute would have been fulfilled.
Had the proceedings ended at this stage, each of the three defend-
ants would have been extraditable at the discretion of the Secretary.
The magistrates were making determinations of a kind magistrates
make daily, and their decisions were well-reasoned and clear on these
issues. There is consistency of approach and consistency of ruling.
However, political offense questions were raised in each case, and
each magistrate ruled on those questions. Their rulings neither follow
nor establish discernable rules of law or procedure.77 As a result,
United States policy towards extradition of alleged terrorists remains
confused and unclear.
The distinction between a "terrorist" and a "freedom-fighter" can
only be drawn within the international political context. The flexibility
necessary to make decisions in the area of foreign policy is expected of
the political branches of government, but is antithetical to the idea of a
detached judiciary relying on established rules of law and protecting
the rights of the individual. The new approach to extradition decisions
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976).
75. It is a treaty requirement, not a statutory one, that the charged acts be crimes under
both nations' laws. Extradition Treaty, United States-Great Britain, supra note 4, art. 3;
Extradition Treaty, Dec. 10, 1962, Israel-United States, art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S.
No. 5476; Treaty of Extradition, Feb. 22, 1899, United States-Mexico, 31 Stat. 1818, T.S.
No. 242.
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184, which is quoted, supra note 59.
77. For a thorough analysis and criticism of inconsistent procedure in extradition hear-
ings, see Lubet & Czackes, supra note 1.
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proposed in this Note preserves judicial neutrality while allowing polit-
ically-charged extradition decisions to be made consistently with
broader national policy goals.
VI. TENTATIVE ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE
RESPONSIBILITY
In recent years, both courts and the executive have taken tentative
steps which indicate approval of a division of responsibility in the ex-
tradition process of the kind which is proposed above.
A. Courts Deferring to the Executive
District Judge Morrow's decision to rule on the political offense
question in In re Ezeta bound later courts, by stare decisis, to continue
the practice.7" The resulting chaos in the law is described in earlier
sections of this Note. In a series of recent cases, 79 some courts have
broken with precedent and indicated a desire to change procedure in
the manner proposed above. These courts have been asked by fugitive
offenders to look behind the charges to the motives of the requesting
state, and to rule that the accused is a political offender, but have re-
fused to do so.80 Instead, they have drawn a clear line between the role
of courts and of the executive. The court in In re Sindona81 confirmed
the general rule "that an argument of this kind is not properly ad-
dressed to the court in the extradition hearing, but must be made to the
Department of State, which has the primary responsibility for deter-
mining whether the treaties. . . are being properly respected and car-
78. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894), was a case of first impression. It was
argued that the judge should not rule on the political character of the offenses, but Judge
Morrow chose to do so. He based his decision on treaty language which read: "the provi-
sions of this treaty shallnot apply to any crime or offense of a political character" (emphasis
added). The judge held that the prohibition extends to the action of the committing magis-
trate, and terminates his jurisdiction when the political character of the crime or offense is
established. 62 F. at 997. It should be noted, however, that Judge Morrow specifically dis-
tinguished that treaty language from a treaty which read that ". . . a fugitive criminal shall
not be surrendered. . . ." This Note contends that such language differences show a con-
gressional and executive intent to separate judicial from executive determinations. See text
accompanying notes 59-72, supra.
79. See Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Sindona, 450 F.
Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Escobedo v.
United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980) cert. denied - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 612 (1981).
80. Other courts have accepted this argument. See Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459
(S.D. Fla. 1959); In re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
81. 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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ried out."82 Earlier the court stated the other side of this division of
responsibility: "The court is concerned solely with the question of the
charge of crime, and that crime. . . must be one known as a crime in
the place where the hearing was held."8
Other courts have also taken this restrictive view of their role in
extradition hearings, and have referred political determinations to the
executive.
84
B. Treaty Provisions Emphasizing the Executive's Role
Changes in the language of the political offense exception in new
treaties indicates that the executive authorities of some nations may
also believe that a new division of responsibility is necessary in this
area.
The most common wording in older treaties follows the British
model and reads: "A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the
crime. . . is one of a political character."85 The passive wording of the
exception leaves open the question of who shall determine whether the
exception applies.
86
The drafters of the 1976 Canadian Treaty added a rule of interpre-
tation to the traditional treaty language which reads: "If any question
arises as to whether a case comes within the provisions of this subpara-
graph, the authorities of the Government on which the requisition is
made shall decide."
87
Although one might include courts within the meaning of "gov-
ernment," the addition appears to remove political determinations
from the courts by operation of law. Since the courts' role in political
offense determinations is only court-made law, it is superseded by stat-
utory (or treaty) provisions that conflict with it. This phrasing should
act to preclude the extradition magistrate from ruling on political of-
fenses in Canadian-American extradition cases.
The 1980 treaty with Mexico refines the rule of interpretation,
eliminating any ambiguity which might exist after the Canadian
Treaty. Article 5 reads:
82. Id., at 694.
83. Id., at 693, quoting In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 73-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
84. See note 78, supra.
85. Extradition Treaty, United States-Great Britain, supra note 4, art. 6.
86. In United States practice, courts usually have decided the cases arising under these
treaties, but court action is not mandated by treaty language. See discussion, supra note 78.
87. Treaty of Extradition, March 22, 1976, United States-Canada, art. 4(1)(iii), 27
U.S.T. 983, 988, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 (emphasis added).
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1. Extradition shall not be granted when the offense for which it is
requested is political or of a political character. If any question
arises as to the application of the foregoing paragraph, the Executive
authority of the requested Party shall decide.8"
These recent changes in the language of extradition treaties, ap-
pear to be an attempt by the executive to reassert control over the polit-
ical component of extradition proceedings.
VII. CONCLUSION
The political offense exception included in all United States extra-
dition treaties has been a source of inconsistent and poorly reasoned
judicial decisions for many years. Courts have had difficulty assessing
complex political situations and allegedly political acts in order to ap-
ply the Anglo-American "incidence test," which has remained un-
changed for eighty-five years. The courts' inability to consistently
evaluate political offense cases using the test is particularly problematic
in the context of international terrorism, where the uncertainty of deci-
sions may pose a serious threat to world political order. The solution to
the problem lies in declaring political offense decisions to be political
questions which the courts will refrain from determining.
A new procedure, compatible with present statutory law, would
divide the responsibility of making extradition decisions between the
judiciary and the executive. Initial determinations of probable cause
and sufficiency of evidence would be made by the courts, which are
experienced at making such decisions. The executive branch, charged
by the Constitution with making foreign policy, would determine the
political or non-political nature of a fugitive's acts. The application of
this two-stage process would result in decisions compatible both with
the protection of individual rights and with foreign policy commit-
ments to the international community to cooperate in the suppression
of crime.
88. Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 25, 1980, United States-Mexico, art. 5(1), 31 U.S.T. 1,
5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
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ADDENDUM
After the completion of this Note, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decided Eain v. Wilkesa in which it affirmed the extradition of
Abu Eain.b In the appellate courts, the United States argued that the
political offense decision was non-justiciable. The argument was very
similar to that made in this Note.
The court refused to accept the government's argument, and ex-
pressly held political offense determinations to be within the power of
the courts.c The opinion of Judge Wood rejects the non-justiciability
argument without meeting it, however, and is basically a judicial ipse
dixit.
In rejecting the argument based on Baker v. Carrd that the applica-
tion of the political offense exception requires "an initial policy deter-
mination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion, ' the court
simply states the indisputable rule that "courts have authority to con-
strue treaties."' This both begs the question and misses the point. The
criticism of past judicial determinations, outlined in this Note, is
largely based on the demonstrated inability of the courts to construe
this particular kind of treaty provision with any semblance of consis-
tency. Baker v. Carr requires the judiciary to look to the individual
situation before it to determine justiciability. A broad invocation of
generally accepted judicial power is not a sufficient response to the
Baker v. Carr test.
The Seventh Circuit also implies that there is a congressional man-
date in the extradition statute that courts must make the political of-
fense determination.- This is simply not the case, as shown in section
IV of this Note.h The sole legal basis for judicial application of what is
an exception to other treaty provisions is the decision in In re Ezeta.i
Ezeta has erroneously been interpreted as providing a general rule for
extradition determinations since it was decided in 1894. A careful
a. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
b. See text accompanying notes 39-40, supra.
c. 641 F.2d at 513-17.
d. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also text accompanying notes 43-58 supra.
e. 369 U.S. at 217.
f. 641 F.2d at 514.
g. "mhe extradition statute requires the magistrate to determine that the crime al-
leged is listed in the applicable treaty, and that the provision ofthe treaty relating to political
offenses does or does not apply." 641 F.2d at 515 (emphasis added). The italicized portion of
the quotation does not appear in any form in the statute. For statute text, see note 59, supra.
h. See text accompanying notes 59-72, supra.
i. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
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reading of Judge Morrow's opinion.shows, however, that he made the
political offense determination in that case because of the peculiar
treaty language involved there, and not because of a statutory require-
ment. The treaty involved in Ezela reads: "The provisions of this
treaty shall not apply to any crime of a political character."i That
wording is not contained in most modem extradition treaties, and may
in fact be unique.' Judge Morrow recognized that the provision was
unusual and stated in the opinion:
[I]t is said that all the testimony is to be taken by the committing
magistrate, and upon such testimony and the records of the state de-
partment the president is to determine whatever political questions
there may be involved in the case .... The case of Castioni [1891] 1
Q.B. 149, is cited in support of such a procedure; but that case was
based upon... a statute clearly authorizing the proceedings, and
providing: that 'a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the
offense in respect to which his surrender is demanded is one of a
political character.' 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52, § 3. In this case the prohibi-
tion is not that there shall be no surrender but that 'the provisions of
this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offense of a political char-
acter.' The prohibition extends to the action of the committing mag-
istrate, and terminates his jurisdiction. .... 1
The finding of Ezeta was therefore founded on language which de-
prived the court of jurisdiction over the defendant if a political offense
was involved, as distinguished from a provision excepting a political
criminal from extradition, which Judge Morrow would have left to the
President to decide.
Courts today clearly need not consider themselves bound by the
"rule" in Ezeta, since that rule was limited to the determination of a
jurisdictional point concerning unusual treaty language. Nothing in
the extradition statute or in later case law requires the judicial determi-
nation which the Seventh Circuit assumes for itself based on In re
Ezeta.
It is submitted that the theory presented by the government in Eain
v. Wilkes, and by this Note remains viable despite the Seventh Circuit
ruling. The opinion fails to meet the policy arguments for non-jus-
ticiability,m but rather meets just one branch of the Baker v. Carr test
j. Treaty of Extradition, May 23, 1870, United States-El Salvador, art. 3, 18 Stat.
639, T.S. No. 309, terminated March 2, 1904, quoted in 62 F. at 997.
k. For modem treaty language see notes 85-88 and accompanying text, supra.
L 62 F. at 997.
m. See text accompanying notes 55-58, supra.
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with conclusory disagreement.n
n. Section IV of the Eain v. Wilkes decision, which discusses the political offense test, is
a useful addition to the case law. Although the court does not reject the "incidence test," it
does discuss many of the problems inherent in that test in the context of terrorist activities.
It is to be hoped that direct judicial recognition of the problem may be a step toward a
congressional resolution of the problem.
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